David Gillum, Rebecca Moritz, and Gregory D. Koblentz, “The ‘Risky Research Review Act’ Would Do More Harm than Good,” STAT News, July 19, 2024.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Rocco Casagrande, “Beyond Gain of Function: Strengthening Oversight of Research with Potential Pandemic Pathogens,” Pathogens and Global Health, October 4, 2023.
Gene Godbold, F. Curtis Hewitt, Anthony D. Kappell, Matthew B. Scholz, Stacy L. Agar, Todd J. Treangen, Krista L. Ternus, Jonas B. Sandbrink, and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Improved Understanding of Biorisk for Research Involving Microbial Modification Using Annotated Sequences of Concern,” Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology, Vol. 11, April 25, 2023.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Rocco Casagrande, “Biology is Dangerously Outpacing Policy,” New York Times, February 20, 2023.
Ryan S. Houser, Gregory D. Koblentz, and Filippa Lentzos, “Understanding Biosafety and Biosecurity in Ukraine,” Health Security, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2023).
Gregory D. Koblentz and Filippa Lentzos, “A Plan B to Strengthen Biosafety and Biosecurity,” Think Global Health, November 15, 2022.
Jonas B. Sandbrink, Ethan C. Alley, Matthew C. Watson, Gregory D. Koblentz, and Kevin M. Esvelt, “Insidious Insights: Implications of Viral Vector Engineering for Pathogen Enhancement,” Gene Therapy, Vol. 30 (2023), pp. 407-410.
Jonas Sandbrink and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Risks Associated with Vaccine Platform Technologies,” Vaccine, Vol. 40, No. 17 (2022), pp. 2514-2523.
Filippa Lentzos, Gregory D. Koblentz, and Joseph Rodgers, “The Urgent Need for an Overhaul of Global Biorisk Management,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 15, No. 4 (April 2022), pp. 23-29.
Filippa Lentzos and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Have Hybrid Coronaviruses Already Been Made? We Simply Don’t Know for Sure, and That’s a Problem,” The Conversation, February 21, 2022,
Sriharshita Musunuri, Jonas B Sandbrink, Joshua Teperowski Monrad, Megan J. Palmer, and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks,” mBio, Vol. 12, No. 5 (September-October 2021): e01864-21.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “California Biosecurity Bill Safeguards Bioeconomy and Public Health,” Sacramento Business Journal, September 23, 2021.
Joseph Rodgers, Filippa Lentzos, Gregory D. Koblentz, and Minh Ly, “How to Make Sure the Labs Researching the Most Dangerous Pathogens are Safe and Secure,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2, 2021.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Filippa Lentzos, “Whether Covid Came from a Leak or Not, It’s Time to Talk about Lab Safety,” The Guardian, June 15, 2021.
Filippa Lentzos and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Fifty-Nine Labs Around World Handle the Deadliest Pathogens--Only a Quarter Score High on Safety,” The Conversation, June 14, 2021.
Jonas Sandbrink and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Risks Associated with Vaccine Platform Technologies,” Vaccine, February 25, 2021.
Kyle E. Watters, Jesse Kirkpatrick, Megan J. Palmer, and Gregory D. Koblentz, “The CRISPR Revolution and its Potential Impact on Global Health Security,” Pathogens and Global Health, Vol. 115, No. 2 (2021), pp. 80-92.
Filippa Lentzos and Gregory D. Koblentz, Mapping Maximum Biological Containment Labs Globally (London: King’s College London, May 2021).
Gregory Lewis, Jacob L. Jordan, David A. Relman, Gregory D. Koblentz, Jade Leung, Allan Dafoe, Cassidy Nelson, Gerald L. Epstein, Rebecca Katz, Michael Montague, Ethan C. Alley, Claire Marie Filone, Stephen Luby, George M. Church, Piers Millett, Kevin M. Esvelt, Elizabeth E. Cameron, and Thomas V. Inglesby, “The Biosecurity Benefits of Genetic Engineering Attribution,” Nature Communications, Vol. 11 (December 8, 2020): 6294.
Brian L. Pike and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Lessons from the Roosevelt: A Call for Improving the U.S. Navy’s Preparedness for Biological Threats,” War on the Rocks, November 12, 2020.
Saskia Popescu and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Hear, See, and Speak No COVID: Why the Trump Administration is Bungling the Response to the Pandemic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 18, 2020.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Michael Hunzeker, “National Security in the Age of Pandemics,” Defense One, April 3, 2020.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “A Biotech Firm Made a Smallpox-Like Virus on Purpose. Nobody Seems to Care,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 21, 2020.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Historical Aspects of Biological Weapons Development and Use,” in Sunit K. Singh and Jens H. Kuhn, eds., Defense Against Biological Attacks, Volume I (Basel, Switzerland: Springer Nature AG, 2019).
Jesse Kirkpatrick, Gregory D. Koblentz, Megan J. Palmer, Edward Perello, David A. Relman, and Sarah W. Denton, Editing Biosecurity: Needs and Strategies for Governance of Genome Editing (Arlington, VA and Palo Alto, CA: George Mason University and Stanford University, 2018).
Jesse Kirkpatrick, Gregory D. Koblentz, Megan Palmer, Sarah W. Denton, and Bruce Tiu, Biotechnology Governance: Landscape and Options, Biosecurity in the Age of Genome Editing Working Paper No. 2 (Arlington, VA and Palo Alto, CA: George Mason University and Stanford University, March 2018).
Gregory D. Koblentz, Jesse Kirkpatrick, Megan Palmer, Sarah W. Denton, Bruce Tiu, and Kelsey Gloss, Biotechnology Risk Assessment: State of the Field, Biosecurity in the Age of Genome Editing Working Paper No. 1 (Arlington, VA and Palo Alto, CA: George Mason University and Stanford University, December 2017).
Gregory D. Koblentz, “A Critical Analysis of the Scientific and Commercial Rationales for the Synthesis of Horsepox Virus,” mSphere, Vol. 3, No. 2 (March/April 2018), pp. 1-10.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Lynn C. Klotz, “New Pathogen Research Rules: Gain of Function, Loss of Clarity,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 26, 2018.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Smallpox Could Again Be a Serious Threat,” Slate, October 19, 2017.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “The De Novo Synthesis of Horsepox Virus: Implications for Biosecurity and Recommendations for Preventing the Reemergence of Smallpox,” Health Security, Vol. 15, No. 5 (August 2017), pp. 1-9.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Nathaniel Morra, “Pandemics, Personnel, and Politics: How the Trump Administration is Leaving Us Vulnerable to the Next Outbreak,” Global Biodefense, April 6, 2017.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Paul F. Walker, “Can Bill Gates Rescue the Bioweapons Convention?’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 3, 2017.
Filippa Lentzos and Gregory D. Koblentz, “It’s Time to Modernize the Bioweapons Convention,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 4, 2016.
Gregory Koblentz and Filippa Lentzos, 21st Century Biodefence: Risks, Trade-offs, and Responsible Science, BWC Review Conference Series Paper No. 3 (Oslo, Norway: International Law and Policy Institute, 2016).
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Quandaries in Contemporary Biodefense Research,” in Filippa Lentzos, ed., Biological Threats in the 21st Century (London: Imperial College Press, 2016), pp. 303-328.
Mahdi F.H. Al Jewari and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Strengthening Biosecurity in Iraq: Development of a National Biorisk Management System,” Frontiers in Public Health, Vol. 4, Article 25 (February 26, 2016), pp. 1-4.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Physics Favors Deterrence; Biology Doesn’t,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 27, 2015.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “The Myth of Biological Weapons as the Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 18, 2015.
Gregory D. Koblentz,” Dual-Use Research as a Wicked Problem,” Frontiers in Public Health, Vol. 2 (August 4, 2014), pp. 1-4.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism,” in Simon Rushton and Jeremy Youde, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Global Health Security (Oxford: Routledge, 2014), pp. 118-129.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Beyond Technology: The Social Dimensions of Biological Weapon Threats,” review of Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? A New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats by Kathleen M. Vogel, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2014), pp. 99-103.
Gregory D. Koblenz and Brian M. Mazanec, “Viral Warfare: The Security Implications of Cyber and Biological Weapons,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 32, No. 5 (2013), pp. 418-434.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “From Biodefense to Biosecurity,” International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 1 (2012), pp. 131-148.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Review of Bacillus anthracis and Anthrax by Nicholas H. Bergman, ed.,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24, No. 5 (2012), pp. 860-861.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Marie Isabelle Chevrier, “Modernizing the Confidence Building Measures of the Biological Weapons Convention,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2011), pp. 1-7.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Review of Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense by Margaret Kosal,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 27, No. 5 (September 2010), pp. 659-660.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 96-132.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls of Microbial Forensics,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 1 (February/March 2010), pp. 159-186.
Jonathan B. Tucker and Gregory D. Koblentz, “The Four Faces of Microbial Forensics,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Vol. 7, No 4 (2009), pp. 389-397.
Gregory D. Koblentz, “The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Why Today Is Not 1918,” World Medical and Health Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2009), pp. 71-84.
Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 84-122.
